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114 Members of the seminar who made direct contributions to the production of this book were, in alphabetical order of their names:

Mr. Chang Chih-yi, Fellow of the Page School and formerly a Research Associate of the Academia Sinica. Mr. Chang was largely educated in Manchuria, so that his frontier interests and associations go back for many years. In 1944 he carried out independent field work in Sinkiang, especially in the southern oasis region, under the auspices of Academia Sinica. His major contribution to this book was to the chapter on Economic Development (XI).

Dr. Chen Han-seng, a Fellow of the Page School in 1946–1947 and 1947–1948, took a leading part nearly twenty years ago, as a senior member of Academia Sinica, in setting up modern scientific methods and standards in the study of colonization in Manchuria. As organizer and supervisor he was also responsible for field studies in economics and sociology in many other parts of China. During the war he carried out independent field work on the China-Tibet frontier and the China-Burma frontier. One of China's outstanding authorities on agrarian economic history, he has also an exceptional insight into the working processes of non-Chinese frontier societies which are in the process of being modified by contact with Chinese culture and by the effects of Chinese administration. His principal contributions were to the chapters on Chinese Policies, Social Structures, and the Crossroads of Inner Asia (III, VI, VII).

Dr. John De Francis, of the staff of the Page School, was my indispensable assistant in directing the work of the seminar and in co-ordinating the research of its members. He himself carried out one of the most important sections of the research in analyzing the different schools of nationalism in Sinkiang and their relation to partly distinct but partly overlapping nationalities. Among American social scientists Dr. De Francis is establishing for himself a leading position in the field of nationalism in the Far East, especially as it is expressed in "nationalism of language" and other forms of cultural nationalism. His study of National-

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ism and Language Reform in China[2] is the authoritative discussion of this problem in contemporary China. In his work on this and kindred problems Dr. De Francis has had the exceptional advantage of travel in Inner Mongolia and Northwest China, followed by careful linguistic training in America, work on early Chinese history, and long-continued study of both the theoretical literature and the political programs of the Kuomintang, the Chinese Communists, and minor Chinese political parties and intellectual movements. His major contribution was to the chapter on the Peoples of Sinkiang (IV).

Mrs. Eleanor Holgate Lattimore, as a volunteer member of the seminar, kept the records of seminar discussions and was also responsible for the greater part of the arduous work of preliminary, intermediate, and final editing without which group research can never achieve the smooth efficiency of teamwork.

Dr. Karl H. Menges, of Columbia, facilitated the work of the whole group by his extraordinary knowledge of Inner Asian languages, the histories of these languages, and the relation of language to other aspects of culture. An expert in the Slavic languages as well as the Turco-Mongol or Altaic languages, Dr. Menges made two journeys in the Soviet Republics of Inner Asia in the period between the two world wars to collect materials, and has edited texts from Sinkiang.[3] His principal contribution to the seminar was in his translations from the Hoover Library materials.

Dr. Daniel Thorner, a Fellow of the Page School in 1947–1948 and now Research Assistant Professor in the Program of South Asia Regional Studies being conducted at the University of Pennsylvania, was with the U. S. Foreign Economic Administration in India during the war. His researches during the past decade on the modern political and economic development of India provided the background for work on the history of Anglo-Rus-

[2] *Nationalism and Language Reform in China*, Princeton University Press, 1950.

[3] *Volkskundliche Texte aus Ost-Türkistan, aus dem Nachlass von N. Th. Katanov herausgegeben*, Berlin, I, 1933; II, 1943. (Dr. Menges's name was suppressed when these volumes were published in Germany.)

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sian Rivalry in Inner Asia. His principal contributions were to the chapters on this Anglo-Russian Rivalry and the Crossroads of Inner Asia (II, VII). In addition, his wife, Mrs. Alice Thorner, contributed a valuable study of the widely scattered international literature on the art and archaeology of Sinkiang. (Appendix I).

Mr. Thomas Wiener, of Columbia, and now of Duke University, had undertaken research on nationalism in Russian Central Asia, especially Kazakh nationalism in the nineteenth century, before he joined the Inner Asian Seminar. His principal contributions were to the chapter on Nationalities and the appendix on Literature and Oral Art.

The fullest measure of credit is due to all these members of the seminar. The work of most members was devoted more to some parts of the book than to others. All work, however, was put through the process of seminar discussion, and was subject to revision as the result of this process. All final decisions, however, on what to say and how to say it have been mine. All facts used have been carefully checked. All statements of opinion have been made after deliberation, and worded with care. It is always possible that statements of fact may later prove to be incorrect or incomplete. It is always possible for statements of opinion to be challenged. For any inadequacy of fact or opinion, I am alone responsible.

OWEN LATTIMORE

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197 tion of the ten languages of Sinkiang, together with the number
162 of speakers of each, is as follows:[3]

	I Altaic		
A. *Turkic*[4]			
1. Uighur	2,941,000		
2. Kazakh	319,000		
3. Kirghiz	65,000		
4. Uzbek	8,000		
5. Tatar	5,000		
		3,338,000	
B. *Mongolian*			
6. Mongolian		63,000	
C. *Tungusic*			
7. Manchu		12,000	
		TOTAL	3,413,000
	II Indo-Chinese		
8. Chinese	294,000		
		TOTAL	294,000
	III Indo-European		
9. Iranian	9,000		
10. Russian	13,000		
		TOTAL	22,000

144 An attempt to analyze or classify the population of Sinkiang
114 accurately on the basis of races or nationalities is complicated by

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] There is, strictly speaking, no "Turki language" or "Turkic language"; no one speaks "Turki" any more than anyone speaks "Romance." In the nineteenth century literature, especially, the term Turki was often applied to the language spoken by the people now called Uighurs, and also to the people themselves. This usage is now out-of-date.

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the frequently loose and unscientific use of terms by foreign travelers and, much more important, by political motives on the part of Chinese administrators and Turkic nationalist leaders.

It is paradoxical that the sorting out of the peoples of Sinkiang is made more difficult by the fact that there is a rich Russian and Western literature about Sinkiang. For nearly a century there has been incessant publication of books about Inner Asia by explorers, archaeologists, geographers and casual travelers. Unfortunately, in the greater part of the foreign literature the descriptions of racial type, national grouping and political affiliation are excessively loose. For example, an American writer refers to the "distinctly Aryan" features of a regional group, to a "Kirghiz race," and to evidence of "Turkish and Mongol blood" in Kashgar.[5] "Aryan" can only be used properly in the description of languages, not of races, and even as a linguistic term it has now largely been abandoned, while peoples who speak the Turkish, Kirghiz, or Mongol languages may be of the most various and mixed origin.

Loose terminology in the foreign literature leads merely to misunderstanding or irritation, but it is politically dangerous when it is used to clothe the theories of administrators who are in a position to act. Contemporary Chinese political theories applied to concepts of race and nationality are of critical importance where Chinese administrative policy is confronted at every turn by growing nationalist movements which compete both with each other and with the projects of Chinese politicians. It is therefore essential to sort out the terms used both by Chinese administrators and by nationalist leaders, before attempting an accurate and rational classification of the many peoples who make up the population of Sinkiang.

In China, attempts to classify the peoples of Sinkiang in ways which reinforce political theories have led to four main trends.

The first trend is called *Ta Han Chu-i*, the "Greater Chinese Theory," by the Chinese who do not support it, and by Mongol, Uighur, and other nationalists who fear it. According to this defi-

[5] William James Morden, *Across Asia's Snows and Deserts*, New York, London, 1927.

1: Lattimore [redacted] (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

*829 *563 665

stress off all political cleavages, from the great cleavage between the Kuomintang and the Communists down to all minor factional quarrels. The National Salvationist point of view was thus well suited to the attempt to create a harmonious wartime morale in Sinkiang.

829 •114 *563

In line with the National Salvationist influence in his entourage, General Sheng proclaimed a program of "Six Great Policies." [9] Under one of the policies the peoples of Sinkiang were officially classified as belonging to fourteen "nationalities." These, listed in the order of the documents of the period, are as follows:

Chinese	202,239	Taranchi	41,307
Manchu	670	Tatar	4,601
Mongul	63,018	Kirghiz	65,248
Moslem (Dungan)	92,146	Uzbek	7,966
Uighur	2,900,173	Sibo	9,203
Kazakh	318,716	Solon	2,489
Tajik	8,867	Russian	13,408

The criteria for this classification are not clear. The admiring translator of the admiring adviser of Sheng Shih-ts'ai comments that the confusion in criteria is such as "would tend to eliminate this as any 'scientifically' worked out ethnic list." [10] Nor can it be based on geographic criteria, for the groups are not delimited on a territorial basis. It is not based on economic criteria, for some of the groups consist of pastoral herdsmen and others of sedentary cultivators. It is not based on religious criteria, for only the Chinese-speaking Moslems are listed as "Moslems," while followers of other religions are not mentioned as such, and other Moslems, such as the Uighurs, are not identified by religion. It is not based on administrative criteria, for Sinkiang is divided into ten administrative areas which cut across the fourteen groups. It is not based, finally, on any observable combination of these criteria.

[9] See Chapter III.

[10] Martin R. Norins, *Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang*, New York, John Day, 1944, p. 91.

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It is probable that this classification, the vehicle of which appeared to be a policy more liberal than any previous Chinese policy toward minorities, represented an attempt at cautious partial imitation of the Soviet minority policy. The imitation, however, did not go very far. Sheng Shih-ts'ai, as his subsequent history shows, was by no means a slavish follower of the Soviet Union or its ideas. The sole emphasis in his program was on promoting the culture of the minority peoples, a policy which permitted cultural autonomy but carefully stopped short of territorial or political autonomy. Indeed it would appear, especially in view of Sheng's administrative gerrymandering of the province, that his purpose was to manipulate the national classifications which he recognized in such a way as to strengthen the dominant position of the Chinese minority in the province. General Sheng's classification was in fact influenced by political criteria which if not precisely scientific are at least as old as the earliest empire.

The program promoted by Sheng Shih-ts'ai was in large measure taken over by Chang Chih-chung when he in turn became head of the province. Like his predecessor, Chang was most active in stressing the cultural differences among the fourteen peoples of Sinkiang. Unlike the extreme authoritarians of the C.C. Clique, he appeared to concede that the different peoples of Sinkiang, rather than such administrative units as the counties, should provide the basis of self-rule. "The administration of Sinkiang," he says, "should be entrusted to the various racial groups and should function under the guidance of the many national leaders of the province." [11] This formula, however, glosses over the fact that the administrative divisions of Sinkiang do not coincide with the distribution of "the various racial groups." Further limitations on the right of self-rule are indicated by the following:

> The Central Government is willing to surrender all political power to the people of Sinkiang on condition that the

[11] Chang Chih-chung, "Dilemma in Sinkiang," *Pacific Affairs*, XX, New York, 1947, p. 426.

174 In periods both of centralization and decentralization the so-
178 cieties of Sinkiang have reflected different aspects of a slowly evolving feudalism. We have no historical description of a truly "primitive" society in Sinkiang; though the Stone Age finds prove that primitive peoples did once exist there, as in China itself. But the oasis "kingdoms" which the Chinese described some two thousand years ago were feudal, rather than primitive or tribal, both in their structure of rank and power and in such relationships as war and the collection of tribute. Nor do the Chinese chronicles describe steppe nomadism at a truly primitive level, but rather at the level of the formation of war bands and the development of early institutions to regularize personal loyalty which can be called "early feudal" or "proto-feudal." [1]

In general, it can be said that both the oasis society and the steppe nomad society tended to evolve toward higher feudal forms of development in periods of centralization, and to devolve back toward earlier forms in periods of decentralization. The main difference between the oasis society and the steppe society was that devolution in the steppe society tended to be more extreme, and to fall back to the war-band stage of development at the very threshold of feudalism.

174 A description of the societies of Sinkiang in terms of feudalism
566 must in itself be a test of theories of feudalism. Many Western
114 writers on feudalism are not prepared to admit that there is any society in Asia that can properly be described as "feudal." Lack of material from Asia in Western comparative studies of feudalism is, however, in the main attributable to the lag in Western studies in the social sciences as a whole in Asia.

A more serious difficulty is the fact that there are no criteria of

[1] An interesting attempt to describe what may be called the "process of emergence" of feudalism has been made by Professor S. Yushkov in his article "On the question of the pre-feudal ('barbarian') state," in *Questions of History*, No. 7 of 1946, Moscow, 1946, pp. 45–64 (in Russian). The article is of particular importance because it attempts to compare as "contemporary" (in Toynbee's sense) material taken from ninth and tenth century Kievan Russia, sixth to ninth century Anglo-Saxon England, and eleventh and twelfth century Mongolia.

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feudalism to which equal acceptance is given by all students of the subject. Thus Dr. Helen Maud Cam, writing of English feudalism, points out that "the social, the economic, the legal and the constitutional historian approach it with different mental assumptions." To the social historian, it is the consecration of inequality or the insistence on subordination. To the economic historian it is the organization of land cultivation by the exercise of rights over persons. To the legal historian it is the contractual relationship guaranteed by land and determined by tenure. To the constitutional historian landholding is the source of political power, and government functions are bound up with land tenure.

"Thus in studying different periods," she concludes, "the social, the economic, the legal and the constitutional historian will each apply his own test to the state of things he finds, and declare that this is, or is not, 'genuine feudalism,' while his conclusions will be hotly questioned by those who use a different criterion." [2]

On the other hand a great deal of the most important modern literature on Inner Asia, including Sinkiang, is in Russian; and even in Tsarist times the vocabulary of feudalism was usual among Russian scholars in dealing with the societies of Asia. With the Soviet writers, this practice becomes universal. On the other side of Sinkiang, Chinese sources are of the greatest importance for early and medieval history, and Chinese scholars are doing increasingly important work in the analysis both of historical data and of contemporary problems. The terms of feudalism are quite as important in the work of these Chinese scholars as they are in the Russian literature. In China today, scholars are divided by a controversy similar to the famous nineteenth-century debate between "Westerners" and "Slavophiles" in Russia. As in Russia, the heart of the discussion is whether the Chinese culture is so much a thing apart that it is inappropriate to use the terms used in discussing other cultures, or whether the phenomena of Chi-

[2] Helen Maud Cam, "The Decline and Fall of English Feudalism," in *Liberties and Communities in Medieval England*, Cambridge, 1944, p. 203; paper originally read before the International History Conference at Zürich in 1938.

I: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

566 174 114 nese history are comparable to other historical phenomena, and can therefore be intelligibly described in universally accepted terms. Western scholars, even when dealing with an outlying province like Sinkiang, must keep abreast of the discussions among Chinese social scientists.

The Residue of History

175 In their first great historical period of penetration into Inner Asia under the Han Dynasty, for about two hundred years before and two hundred years after the birth of Christ, the Chinese were concerned primarily with defending the frontier of civilization in China against barbarian incursions from Mongolia and Inner Asia. The maintenance of this frontier was, for the state itself, a perpetual expense, not a profitable expansion. Trade there was, and individuals grew wealthy by it, but the Chinese were not "imperialists" planting the flag farther and farther forward in order to have trade follow it. They were not opening up colonial conquests in order to get at bulk supplies of cheap raw materials — the costs of transport were too high — nor was there a surplus of production in China forcing them to seek new markets.[3]

The curiosities and luxuries brought to China through the Inner Asian trade contributed to the ostentation of the court. On the other hand the commodities going by caravan from China to Inner Asia consisted in large part of tribute collected by nobles and by the state, before being consigned to the hands of privileged merchants, and therefore were in fact a tax on the people. Certainly the volume of goods leaving China was not determined by the buying power of Inner Asia, because the Chinese records

[3] Frederick J. Teggart, in his *Rome and China: A Study of Correlations in Historical Events*, Berkeley, 1939, lays great emphasis on "interruption of trade" along the Silk Route through Inner Asia as a cause of "correlated" wars on the Roman and Chinese frontiers, but does not raise the question of the difference between profitable expansive trade and trade which, though politically promoted in order to keep warlike barbarians contented, is a drain on the civilized country providing commodities for the barbarians.

2: Norins S-4 (1939-1941) 1944 All Sinkiang All

INTRODUCTION

Sinkiang's Place In the Future of China

By Owen Lattimore

114

There can be few large regions in the world that combine, in the way that Sinkiang does, isolation and a rich literature of travel and of natural and social sciences. Though Sinkiang has never been open to the casual tourist, it has been the setting of some of the major geographical, geological, botanical, archeological and historical investigation and writing of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The names of those who have contributed to the literature include, from the middle ages, William of Rubruck, Carpini, and Marco Polo; the British from Atkinson to Shaw, and Forsyth, and later Ney Elias, Younghusband, Stein and Skrine; the Russians, with perhaps the greatest list of all, including Prjevalskii, the Grum-Grjimailo brothers, Kozlov, Obruchev, and a host of others; the French with Grenard and Pelliot; the Germans with Grünwedel, von le Coq and many writers on linguistics; the Austrian Merzbacher; the Dutch historian De Groot; the Italian De Filippi; Sven Hedin and many younger Swedes and Danes like Bergman and Haslund; and Americans like Schuyler and Huntington. Indeed, it is easier to write a long list than a short one, because the material relating to Sinkiang has led to so much comment, research and speculation in so many countries.

It is noticeable, however, that in the literature of Sinkiang the most important contributions of the Chinese are to be found in the chronicles of the past. Were it not for the Chinese genius for compiling history, our knowledge of the peoples and tribes and politics of Sinkiang for more than two thousand years would be much more shadowy. In the nineteenth century, however, Chinese concern with Sinkiang became more and more perfunctory, and the Chinese literature less important and poorer in quality. Even when dealing with the distribution, characteristics, and political grouping of the peoples of Sinkiang, Chinese writers began to show a weak tendency to forego direct observation and rely instead on quotation.

2: Norins S-4 (1939-1941) 1944 All Sinkiang All

114 This fading out of the Chinese interest in Sinkiang reflected a major change in China's fortunes. During the nineteenth century Western imperialism began to press heavily on China from the seacoast, and consequently Chinese thought drew away from the landward frontiers. It is true that Tsarist Russia threatened to penetrate and even to annex Mongolia and Sinkiang, while the British exercised more real control in Tibet than did the Chinese; but these were the least Chinese territories of China, most of whose people differed in their way of life from the Chinese, and few of whom even spoke Chinese. Naturally, in a long period of great danger to the Chinese nation as a whole, attention was concentrated on the areas of densest Chinese population near the coast, and on political relations with those countries which had the kind of power that expressed itself in the "gunboat policy" of the nineteenth century.

In our own time we can see why the Chinese, without turning away from their long maritime coast and the future developments in trade and politics with which they will have to deal along that coast, are also turning back to their long inland frontiers and enquiring into the future opportunities and problems of the deep hinterland. The Sino-Swedish Scientific Expedition, which carried on Sven Hedin's later exploration work in Sinkiang, included several Chinese scientists who published not only scientific papers but accounts of their travels, with comments on contemporary affairs in Central Asia. In the same period a Chinese diplomat, Aitchen K. Wu, published a lively personal account of the political intrigue and civil war out of which there finally developed the recent progressive tendencies of Sheng Shih-ts'ai. An English version of his book has been published under the title of *Turkistan Tumult*.

In the same period there flourished a considerable periodical literature, including such journals as the *Northwest Monthly* and many articles in other journals, like *New Asia* and the scholarly *Yü Kung*, or *The Chinese Historical Geography*. The early years of this literature have seen the publication of much that is of only secondary value; but there is a clear tendency for the literature to increase in importance, and the time will come when Western political scientists and econ-

omists who wish to deal authoritatively with the questions of Central Asia will have to depend more and more on Chinese materials. 114

Mr. Norins' work marks the beginning of this trend. He has not been able to travel in Sinkiang, but by study of contemporary Chinese source materials he has been able to expand the observations of Western travelers and to produce an interesting and important book. The trend will go on. There is a clear prophecy of this in the fact that in his use of Chinese sources Mr. Norins finds evidence of lively differences of views and interpretations. China's rediscovery of Chinese Central Asia will be accompanied by controversy, and the different policies advanced in controversy will have an international as well as a domestic significance.

Within the area occupied by Sinkiang there probably lies the geographical center of gravity between the Atlantic, Arctic, Pacific and Indian Oceans. There was a time, toward the end of the last century, when Kipling was writing about the "grey menace" of Tsarist Russia, and when Russian and British explorers, apprehensively watching each other and sometimes actually putting each other under arrest, were trying to discover and list all the passes across the Pamirs, the Karakoram and the Himalayas. What they were looking for was an "artillery pass"—a way by which wheeled vehicles could link up the zones of British and Russian imperialist expansion in Inner Asia. During this period Sinkiang, like Afghanistan, was in danger of being ground between the upper Russian millstone and the lower British millstone. The serious way in which the rival seekers of the White Man's Burden sent envoys, gifts, and windy despatches to Yakub Beg, a dancing-boy turned brigand, who had overthrown the Manchu-Chinese power at Kashgar, makes grotesque and sometimes bloody reading. 000

This period ended in an anti-climax. It was discovered that there was no "artillery pass." It would be too expensive either for the British to encroach on territory coveted by the Russians, or for the Russians to push their Central Asian conquests actually to within snatching distance of the "brightest jewel in the British crown." It then became convenient to recall the sovereignty of Afghanistan and China. With appropriate solemnity, frontiers were delimited in such a way that a

3: Skrine G-3 (1922-1924) 1926 All Sinkiang All

influences from the China of the Han and Tang Emperors mingled with those transmitted through Iran and North-West India from the great world of Hellenism in the West. It was through the channel of the Tarim Basin and the medium of its settled populations that the fame of the "silk-weaving Seres" and the fine products of Chinese looms reached the Mediterranean and became known throughout the Roman Empire. It was by this same route that the elements of Indian as well as of Græco-Roman art and culture reached China's western borders. More important still, it was along the Khotan road that Buddhism, in Stein's words "India's greatest contribution to the spiritual development of mankind," found its roundabout way in the first century of our era to China through the Central Asian kingdoms.

It would be presumption for me to attempt even the briefest survey of the immense field covered by the archæological discoveries of Sir Aurel Stein among the sands of the Takla Makan and elsewhere in Chinese Turkistan and Kansu. I can but refer the art-loving reader to those monuments of fascinating if recondite erudition, "Ruins of Desert Cathay," "Serindia," and the rest. Here will be brought vividly before his eyes the splendour of Khotan's Græco-Buddhist civilization, in the days when that ancient kingdom was culturally an Indian colony.[1] He will discover for himself how exquisitely that civilization was tinged by the classic art of China; he will see, on the other hand, how in the east of the province and along the great Silk Road the powerful influences of Græco-Buddhist and even of purely Persian art modified the work of Chinese masters. The frescoes of Miran, the classical seals of Yotkan, the relievos of Khadaliq, the wood-carvings of Niya, the amazing painted silks, brocades, tapestries and embroideries of the Cave of the Thousand Buddhas—these and many other beautiful things appeal to the lover of art, and not to him alone. They appeal even more strongly to the Western student of *les vieilles civilisations qualitatives*, as Ferrero calls them, which aimed at perfection rather than progress or power—the old civilizations which we have so ruthlessly destroyed in our pursuit of wealth and our conquest of the earth, and which now, too late, we find to be our lost Paradise.

My few excursions into this field of research may be dismissed briefly. In the course of long tours on Consular duty, when our programme had to be thought out carefully beforehand

[1] "Ruins of Desert Cathay," Vol. I, p. 290–91.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1
Kazak RQ2

S N 563 233 [423] [476] V. Individualistic and Collectivistic Bents and Traditions

The nomadic society of the Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Mongols shows collectivistic trends insofar as the pastures are always owned collectively and the livestock can be taken care of and protected only cooperatively. In periods of war and uprisings, the livestock had to be protected militarily, which was one reason why the military organization of the nomads, introduced by Chingis Khan, survived up to the twentieth century. Here we can say that the nomadic Kirghiz and Kazakh still shows a tremendous martial spirit, especially the Kazakhs who fought the Communists in 1949 and 1950 in a heroic way in spite of the fact that they were outnumbered from the very beginning.

N S 563 181 As a matter of fact, the Mongols show much less martial spirit than neighboring Kirghiz, Kazakh and especially Tibetans, who constantly rise up here and there, becoming a major nuisance for Peking, although they are hopelessly outnumbered by Chinese Communist Troops. Many explorers agree independently that the Mongols, once intrepid, dauntless, unafraid, frightful and terrifying warriors, make now the impression of being inefficient soldiers, timid, downhearted, and discouraged (so Rockhill, Howorth, Tafel, Vladimirtsov, Hedin, Futterer, and Filchner). Russian scholars, above all B. Vladimirtsov in his Le Regime Social Des Mongols, Le feodalisme Nomade, Paris 1948, blame Buddhism for the disappearance of the martial spirit and courage of the Mongols. This opinion is, however, contradicted by the fact that Tibetans, who have been influenced by Buddhism some centuries longer than the Mongols, are well-known as tough and cunning fighters and apparently fearless and daring insurgents.

S N 563 181 771 114

N 563 992 Almost every Tibetan family has at least one son in a monastery. They faithfully pay their tributes to these monasteries where their sons live as novices or monks. The monasteries are the only cultural centers of the nomads. Kumbum might be named as a magnificent example in regard to external architectural beauty as well as internal wealth in respect to its library, printing house, and the spiritual value of its schools and its Lamaistic academies.

S N 563 668 233 [361] There are many reasons to believe that the Communist regime is determined to abolish nomadism and to make the nomads sedentary or at least semi-sedentary. The first step was the erection of permanent winter sites. The attitude of the nomads toward the regime seems to be ambivalent. The erection of veterinary stations for the livestock and the extension of additional irrigated pastures certainly are measures approved by the nomads but on the other hand the threatening

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*175 under the Ch'ing emperors, reasserted its sway in Turkestan.
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4. Pattern of nomadic expansion and contraction

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175 Wave after wave of nomadic peoples have made their appear-
648 ances and then faded away, leaving the imprint of their stay on the palimpsest of Turkestan. The pattern of their entry, their ascendency, and their exit have been similar. Each outburst and withdrawal of the nomads showed but variations on the major theme. The Huns, the Turks, and the Mongols, to mention a few of the more powerful of the plethora of nomadic peoples, all had their geneses in the same region, an area of Mongolia south of Lake Baikal. The process of their rise to power followed parallel lines. First, there was a bitter internecine struggle from which one group emerged triumphant. Second, the nomadic tribes were unified into a strong coalition under the leadership of the dominant group. Third, they expanded outward from the steppes into neighboring regions, especially into the marginal zone of modern Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia. Then they consolidated these areas into bases of operation for the fourth stage, the invasion and, when successful, the conquest of the opulent agrarian lands. At the peak of their strength, these nomadic invaders would establish a strong, militant empire, under an absolutist government, to control the motley subject peoples under their domination.

But once they reached the peak of their power, the downgrade began. The paucity of their numerical strength made it difficult for them to hold large territories. The tradition of intertribal contest instilled the spirit of independence in the minds of the satraps appointed to rule portions of the far-flung empires. The failure to resolve the incompatibility between pastoral and agrarian economy, and the resentment and rebellious tendency of the subject peoples whom the conquerers were only able to overawe by military strength, were all factors which brought about the disintegration and decline of the empires of the nomads.

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175 5. Theories concerning nomadic eruptions
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648 What accounted for the sudden irresistible ferocity of nomad eruptions and what accounted for the docility of their withdrawal? A number of very ingenious theorires have been advanced, as answers to this intriguing question, but so far these are still in the realm of assumptions.

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175 Many scholars have regarded the influence of climate as a
121 possible cause of the high tide and ebb of nomadic activities.
648 Superimposed on the progressive dessication of Central Asia
132 resulting from the withdrawal of glaciers, were the minor cyclic
● 114 fluctuations of alternating dry and moist spells. A climatologist
182 (C.E.P. Brooks) spoke of the "classical rainfall period of 640 years," and a geographer (Raymond Wheeler) believed in a major alternation of dry and cold every 510 years. Ellsworth Huntington,

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a proponent of the theory of climatic alternations, called the phenomenon "the pulse of Asia."

The most important of the multiple influences is believed to be that of the economic effects of climatic changes. When the climate is warm and moist, the land of the nomads is fertile enough to support the nomads and their herds, but when the climate becomes drier and colder, the rivers and lakes shrink and the pasturage is reduced. This cuts down the food supply and forces the nomads to rampage into the land of their neighbors. Speaking of the thirteenth century, Arnold Toynbee declared that the "paroxysm of aridity coincided in date with the demoniac eruption of the Mongols, and it will be seen that the physiographical recoil towards humidity likewise corresponds in date with the rapid ebb of the Mongols." (A Study of History, vol. III, p. 439).

Although the outbursts and recessions of the nomads were periodic, the rigid periodization was too mechanical and many scholars have discredited climate as the sole factor. Huntington suggests that four factors may have impelled the huge migration of the nomadic peoples, namely: climate, the inherent quality of the people especially as manifested by the leaders, the pull exerted by the wealth and the opportunities of the agricultural lands, and the push exerted by over-population. (Mainsprings of Civilization, p. 568).

NS [233] [262]

A period of peace and prosperity would allow the population of the nomads to increase. However, in the desolate steppes, food was dependent upon flocks of sheep and herds of cattle and horses, and the people, unlike their sedentary neighbors, did not have the tradition nor the facilities for food storage. Any sudden change in climate which caused a reduction of pasturage and water supply would create a 'time of troubles" and compel the nomadic people to migrate in search of food and pasturage.

When the nomads were experiencing a "time of troubles," the lush riches and the military weakness of the settled peoples would tempt border tribes to encroach upon the agrarian regions. Distress and discontent at home and the lure of wealth abroad furnish the push and the pull of Toynbee's theories. When the leavening of bold leadership and ideas were added, the nomads often were induced to burst out from the steppes of Asia and to set the world in commotion.

Other scholars entirely discount the influence of climate and seek the explanation for the advance and withdrawal of the nomads in social and political conditions. Owen Lattimore, who has given much thought to this question, (cf. Inner Asian Frontiers, passim), lists a number of reasons other than climate, for the eruption of the nomads. There were, for example, technological factors like the invention of the powerful compound bow and the technique of mounted archery which gave the nomads an edge over their enemies.

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The Chinese had to adopt the nomad bow and the technique of mounted archery before they could meet the nomads on equal terms.

Another factor, according to Lattimore, was the pastoral economy of the nomads which led to migration. Horses and cattle cannot graze on fields that have been cropped by sheep and goats. Therefore, the nomads whose livelihood depended upon their herds and flocks, must continually seek new pastures. The claims to pasturelands and the right of movement led to wars. The continuous wars stimulated the rise of leaders, hard-headed men who survived the hurly-burly of warfare and politics of the steppes and deserts. Finally, a supreme leader emerged who would then weld the various groups into a grand confederation strong enough to encroach upon the neighboring regions for land, for the profits of trade, and for revenue and tribute from the conquered peoples.

According to Lattimore, the nomads who invaded the marginal zone between the steppes and the settled lands, were not pure nomads but were semi-settled. Their wars of conquest were not only for pastures for their herds and flocks but for land, for the riches of the cities, and for the proceeds of commerce. Moreover, the cycles of their invasion and retreat began only a few centuries before the Christian era when they split from the settled peoples on China's northwestern frontier and when they acquired the technology of nomadic warfare. The true nomads on the steppes evolved from the mixed nomads, not vice versa.

The migrations which led to conquest over a wide area, such as those carried out by the Huns, the Turks and the Mongols, normally did not begin with the true nomads but with the mixed nomads, and were caused by (1) a group breaking away from the mixed nomads in order to become true nomads; or (2) a group breaking away from the true nomads in order to revert back to mixed nomadism. The Huns, Turks, and Mongols had fixed bases of operation and their conquests were for land.

Under these circumstances, according to Lattimore, the cycles of nomadic expansion and withdrawal each went through the following process:

1. The maintenance of large armies of mounted warriors to conquer land for the profit of trade and revenue from subject peoples;
2. A dichotomy of nomad society. The nomadic warriors who went forth to conquer and who were left to garrison conquered territories had control of the sources of wealth but declined militarily. The warriors who stayed in the steppes as the military reserve continued to be warlike but gradually became impoverished;
3. A split within the nomad state between those in the conquered areas and those in the steppes, leading to decline and and withdrawal.

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6. Summary

In summary, the workings of the historical process represented

S N 121 197 563 I. Introduction

Linguistic principles, rather than racial aspects, are used as the standard for the division and description of the various ethnic groups of the Northwest. The Communists also use a linguistic division in their census. It would be impossible to deal with many of these minorities in terms of race, since most represent racial mixtures, e.g. the New-Uighurs, the Mongols, the Monguors, etc.

S N 635 161 The Northwest Region includes the four former provinces of

(1) Sinkiang with a total population of 4,873,608
(2) Kansu with a total population of 12,938,102
(3) Chinghai with a total population of 1,676,534
(4) Shensi with a total population of 15,881,281 (according to 1953 census).

(Although Shensi is included in the Northwest region it has not been considered in the following pages, since it has an exclusively Chinese population.)

S 162 A. The Ethnic Groups of Sinkiang

1. The Turkic peoples

The main racial group in the former Chinese province Sinkiang is Turkic and is composed of the following tribes:

1) New Uighur (or Eastern Turks)	3,600,000 people
2) Kazakhs	300,000 "
3) Kirghiz	70,000 "
4) Taranchi	43,000 "
5) Uzbeks	8,000 "
6) Tatars	5,000 "
	3,426,000

S [114] It should be noted that the Taranchi are listed separately in Communist sources although they are in no way different from the New Uighur. Taranchi means "inhabitant of the country" in contrast to the New Uighurs seventy per cent of whom live in towns and cities.

2. The Chinese Peoples

In terms of the population figures, the second racial group is Chinese:

1) Chinese	about 210,000 people
2) Dungans	about 100,000 " (Chinese Moslems, whose total figure for China as a whole is 3,599,350)

3. The Mongols

The third racial group is composed of Mongols who consist of the following tribes:

1) Olots	15,000 people
2) Torguts	18,000 "
3) Khoshuts	21,000 "
4) Chahar	8,000 "

193 ə, and a. Eastern Turkish has eight backvowels: i, ɯ, u, o, æ
194 ə, a, and ɒ.

1. Scheme of the vowel system of Eastern Turkish

	front:	central:	back:
closed:	i, ʉ	i, ʊ	ɯ, u
half closed:	e, ø		o
half open:	ɛ	ə	æ, ɐ
open:	a		ɑ, ɒ

2. Scheme of the consonantal system of Eastern Turkish

	Explosive		Nasal		Lateral		Tremulans		Fricative		Half vowel	
	v*	uv	v	uv	v	uv	v	uv	v	uv	v	uv
Labials	b	p	m	m̥			r̆		β		w, u̯	
Labial dentals									v	f		
Dentals and alveolars	d	t	n	n̥	l		ṙ	r	z	s		
Supradentals	ɖ	ʈ	ɳ		ɭ							
Palato alveolars									ʑ	ɕ		
Alveolar palatals									ʒ			
Palatals	dʒ	č							j		i̯	
Front velars	g	k	ŋ						ɣ			
Back velars		q							ʁ	χ		
Laryngals										h		

* v means voiced, and uv means unvoiced

104 3. Transcription of Eastern Turkish
114 The transcription of Eastern Turkish used in this paper is the so-called "Association Phonetique Internationale," according to M. Heepe (The Principles of the International Phonetic Association, L'Ecriture Phonetique Internationale.) Prior to the Linguistic Conference of Copenhagen, however, the investigators of the Eastern Turkish dialects used other systems of transcription. Therefore a table showing all the earlier systems is presented.

212 E. Script
The Arabic script is still in use in Sinkiang. In 1940 the

212 In 1940 the
197 Taranchis of the Ili valley, especially those living in Russian territory, abandoned Latin script in favor of Russian script. There is no doubt that in several years Russian script will have replaced Arabic script among the Turks of Sinkiang. This statement is based upon three reasons: 1) in 1917, at the time of the Soviet revolution the Eastern Turks of Soviet territory established a new literary language, the so-called New Uighur literary language. Soviet scholars in Moscow determined the final form of the grammar, vocabulary, and orthography of the new language and also determined the type of literature which could be published. Undoubtedly this will influence the literature of the
[668] Eastern Turks. 2) The forthcoming Turkish nationalism will consider any achievement in this direction as a national aim rather than as an element of secondary sovietization. 3) The Chinese Communist government is contemplating the replacement of the Mongolian and the Arabic alphabets by the Russian.

F. Tables of Transcriptions

104 Table I. The scientific systems of transcription for Eastern
• 114 Turkish used by Radloff, Le Coq, Hartmann, Kunos, Raquette, and the API (Association Phonetique Internationale)

Radloff[10]	Le Coq	Hartmann[11]	Kunos	Raquette	API
ı	ı	ı [ı] [ɛ] [ä]	ı, e	ı	ı
ü	ü	ü [ü] [ö] [ø]	ü	ü	ü
e [æ]	e [e] [æ]	e [e] [æ]	e [e] [æ]	e	e
ö	ö	ö [ö]	ö	ö	ö
ä [æ:] [e]	ä [e] [æ]	ä	ä	ä	æ
a	a	a	a	a	a
—	[ı] [ɪ]	ı, ĕ, y, i	ı, ĕ	ı	ı
—	—	—	ŭ	ŭ	ŭ
—	—	—	ŏ	ŏ	ɔ
ä	—	—	—	ŭ	ɯ
u	u	u	u	u	u
o	[o] [ɔ]	[o] [ɔ] [ø] [ǫ]	[o] [ɔ] [ɔ]	o	o
—	—	—	—	ǫ	ɔ
—	u	ǫ	—	o	ɒ
					ɑ

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Table I (continued)

Radloff	Le Coq	Hartmann	Kúnos	Raquette	API
b	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*
p	*p*	*p*	*p*	*p*	*p*
t	*t*, *ţ*	*t*	*t*	*t*	*t*
		—	—	*ş*	[ʂ]
ǰ, *j*	*ǰ*, *j*	*ž*, *ǧ*	*ǰ*	*j*	*dʒ*
č	*č*	*č*	*č*	*č*	*č*
h	*h* [*ḥ*]	*h*	*h*	*h'*	*h*
x	*χ*	*χ*	*χ*	*χ*	*χ*
d	*d*	*d*	*d*	*d*	*d*
		—	—	*δ*	[*z*]
r	*r*	*r*	*r*	*r*	*r*
z	*z*	*z*	*z*	*z*	*z*
		—	—	*ż*	[*z*]
	ž	*ž*, *j*	*ž*	—	*ʒ*
s	*s*	*s*	*s*	*s*	*s*
š	*š*	*š*	*š*	*š*	*ʃ*
	—	—	—	*x*	[*x*]
	—	—	—	*z*	[*z*]
	—	—	—	*ţ*	[*t*]
	—	—	—	*ð*	[*z*]
	—	—	—	—	—
γ	*γ*	*γ*	*γ*	*γ*	*γ*
f	*f*	*f*	*f*	*f*	*f*
q	*q*	*k*, *q*	*k*	*q*	*q*
k	*k*	*k*	*k*	*k*	*k*
g	*g*	*g*	*g*	*g*	*g*
l	*l*	*l*	*l*	*l*	*l*
m	*m*	*m*	*m*	*m*	*m*
n	*n*	*n*	*n*	*n*	*n*
ń	*ń* [*ńg*], *ŋ*	*ŋ*, *ñ*	*ŋ*	*ñ*	*ŋ*
v	*v*	*v*	*v*	*v*	*v*
—	*w*	*w*	—	*w*	*β*, *w*
h	*h*	*h*	*h*	*h*	*h*
j	*y*	*j*	*j*	*y*	*j*

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Table II. The Arabic symbols which are still in use.

ب *b*	ر *r*	غ *γ*	آ, ا	a, ɒ, ɛ, æ, e, i, ï, u̇, u, o.
پ *p*	ز *z*	ف *f*	ع	a, ɛ, æ, i, ï, u̇, u, ö.
ت *t*	ژ *ž*	ق *q*		
ث *s*	س *s*	ک *k*	و	a, ɔ, o, u, ɯ, u̇, ü, ö, ə.
ج *dʒ*	ش *ʃ*	گ *g*	ه	a, ɛ, æ, e, i.
چ *č*	ص *s*	ل *l*	ی	a, æ, ɛ, e, i, ï, ei.
ح *h*	ض *z*	م *m*		
خ *χ*	ط *t*	ن *n*	او	ɔ, o, u, ɯ, u̇, ü, ö, a.
د *d*	ظ *z*	و *v*, *w*	ای	ɛ, e, i, ï.
ذ *z*		ه *h*		
		ی *j*		

/Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang/

534 Sitar—very similar to the doutar, but has nine strings which are played with a bow.

Tambur—consisting of five strings that are plucked with the fingers.

Rbab—longer than the previously mentioned instruments, a sort of mandolin with five strings along the front of the instrument and five others of different lengths along the side.

Hechtar—a guitar with eight strings.

Ney—a pipe with eight holes.

Surney—a copper trumpet.

Sipay—antelope horn with iron rings.

Dop—a drum.

Kalun—a kind of psaltery (ancient stringed instrument) made of a wooden box on which eighteen pairs of brass wires are strung, supported by wooden pads, regulated by fixed keys at the side. (The Chinese have a similar instrument, and it is possible that the kalun was brought from China.)

535 The dance is performed by both men and women. Each usually dances by himself, although a man and woman may dance together. They sing as they dance. The dance is fiery and rhythmic. The body sways continuously and the arms play a very important part in expressing the mood of the dancer. When a number of women perform together, they usually form a circle and exchange places. They sometimes arrange themselves in a double line or in pairs, each person dancing in her own place. Like the Turkic music, the dance steps seem dull and unvaried to the unaccustomed Western observer.

This form of dance is quite unknown in the Moslem parts of Western Asia, and would be highly frowned upon. Le Coq is of [174] [714] the opinion that these dances were probably inherited from the old pre-Islamic times.

533 535 [179] 668 The arts of folk dance and music have been promoted by the Communists as part of their program of nationality cultural activities and expressions. The professional teams of dancers and musicians perform often in the different National Festivals in China and also abroad. More than encouraging the performance of the existing folk dances and music, the Communists have been promoting the creation of the new "folk dance" and "folk music," to express the new era of liberation. A sample of the results obtained is to be found in the following excerpts from so-called Uighur folk songs:

[539] "You have made our land a lovely garden, Mao Tse-tung,
You are the inspiration of our life, Mao Tse-tung,
We know you have our welfare at heart, Mao Tse-tung,
You are the saviour of our people, Mao Tse-tung,
Long live Mao Tse-tung!
Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah! H-u-r-r-a-h!"

/The Chinese/

knowledge of sanitation and elementary health regulations. Their concepts of health and disease rest mainly on the traditional beliefs. The concept that dominates most of their thinking about the human body and its health is that of the Two Principles of yang and yin. These are philosophical concepts of the origin of all things. The yang principle represents the male and the yin represents the female. They stand for opposite poles - heaven and earth, sun and moon, day and night, heat and cold, life and death, positive and negative, strong and weak.

In medicine, everything is classified as yang or yin. The exterior of the body - the skin - is yang, while the interior is yin. The back is yang, while the abdomen is yin. The heart and liver are yang while the spleen, lungs and kidneys are yin. A disease, accordingly, is yang when due to external causes and yin when due to internal causes. Respiratory diseases, fever, and diseases affecting the upper part of the body are yang diseases. Chills and afflictions of the lower body, and circulatory diseases are yin diseases. When the yin predominates, one suffers from yang disease; when the yang is in excess yin results. These two principles must be kept in mind when treating the disease, since the drugs and herbs are also divided into these two classes.

Another Chinese concept concerning health is that of the existence of the Five Elements - metal, wood, water, fire and earth. According to this belief, the human body is composed of a mixture of the five elements. So long as the proportions of these five elements remain in order, health results. If the balance is disturbed, disease follows.

These beliefs are common mainly among the uneducated population, the rural and the lower classes of the urban population. In most cases, the higher classes have a Western knowledge of the basic elements of health and sanitation and know the basic facts of human physiology and the causes of transmission of diseases. Illiteracy and ignorance is much greater in the Northwest region than along the Pacific Coast. Thus, in the Northwest, the beliefs are widespread and most Western ideas have not penetrated into the larger part of the population.

Unfortunately, we do not have figures on the birth and death rate in Northwest China. The figures for all of China are given in the chapter on "Health and Sanitation" of the General China Handbook.

C. Predominant Diseases Among the Chinese

The most common diseases are the fecal-borne ones. They are spread through the use of human waste as fertilizer. Andre Migot, who travelled through Northwest China in 1946, dwells on this problem in his description of a typical middle-sized town in this area (Tibetan Marches, p. 51): "Then there is the problem of sanitation. The total volume of human excrement produced every day

/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

because there is nothing for which to exchange it. Once a week a caravan carrying Government supplies deposits a bag of flour at the door. This is the subsidy granted to them, in exchange of which her husband is bound to be at his post all through the year, and keep the well from being choked by sand. She has never thought in terms which refer to anything except meals, births and occasionally deaths. Her boys may go farther afield, and if they do, she knows that they will never return, but after a time she will become accustomed to their absence and it will not trouble her again."

With spiritual senses dormant, mental powers arrested and physical demands reduced to the minimum, wherein shall a human being show that he differs from the beasts whose conditions he shares? There is hardly anything which can be called attitudes or reactions.

About the Chinese-speaking Moslems Miss Cable reports that Chinese travelers avoid any inn operated by Moslems because of the rudeness to which they may be subjected when using it. This is a very particular observation, as in other places in the Northwest, non-Moslem Chinese prefer to go to Mohammedan restaurants, which are famed for their cleanliness and tasty food. In many places Moslems have monopolized the innkeeper business, so that they cannot possibly be avoided. Even the Chinese guests abstain from eating pork during their stay, every pot and pan which they possess is considered unclean and will not be allowed inside the kitchen. This is not conducive to good feeling between host and guest, and may at any time lead to high words and even to blows. Toward known westerners the Moslems' attitude is somewhat different, and more tolerant. Cable records the experience of her party in staying in an inn with the sign of "Pure and True Religion" by saying, "The attitude toward our party was different because, though we were styled kaper (infidel) we were known to keep a 'clean' kitchen, which is to say that pork, lard, and every produce of the pig was rigidly excluded from our menu. We were 'infidels of the book' for the Bible and not the Koran was our guide, but we were not 'infidels of the pig' which was an insult reserved for eaters of unclean food. The closest watch was kept upon us as we journeyed, and any lapse or laxity would have been reported to every mosque on our route, so that 'pure religion' inns would have been closed to us. Moslems acknowledged that we were as free from idolatry as themselves, but openly stigmatized us as blasphemers, for we called the prophet Jesus 'Son of God', and the innkeeper turned aside to spit whenever he heard the word." (pp. 72-73). The Moslems who are of means like to make others understand that they are wealthy people. "Like other Tungan landlords to whose houses we had the entree, he left us with a sense that he was very wealthy and that his

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/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

apparent trade of innkeeping was simply a cover for another and more lucrative business." (p. 73).

Like the Chinese, the sinicized Moslems are very much concerned with the problem of offspring. To them continuity of life is bound up with that prolongation of existence which a son secures, one who carries on the life which he owes to his parents. This is a completely Chinese concept. The Chinese-speaking Moslems cannot understand and would certainly not accept the Christian faith that life after death is God's gift, that one does not depend upon a son and his worship, and that immortality means the soul or spirit living eternally in Heaven. Miss Cable records in her book: "We talked often of these things, but it was hard for them to understand what I told them, and they would turn it off with one excuse or another. 'She is different from us', they said, 'her life is given up to God's work and her merit will secure her an entrance to Paradise'. Some envied, some pitied, some just stared and made no effort to understand, others summed it up in these words: 'Eastern ways are for the East, Western ways are for the West.'" (p. 75).

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The Chinese-speaking Moslems in the Northwest, in spite of their having taken up a considerable amount of the Chinese way of life, are deeply conscious of racial and religious inadaptability to Chinese rules. Most of them are always rebellious. They alwasy think that they are oppressed or unfairly treated by the Chinese authorities. For this reason, Moslem revolts occur in the Northwest frequently. For example, the immediate cause of the the 1930 revolt was, according to Miss Cable's account, the suspicion of the Moslems that the Chinese Government was to change their age-old social and political system and that the Chinese population in the area goat many advantages at the expense of the Moslems. Up to 1930 the Moslems in the Hami district of Sinkiang were always governed by a ruler of their own race, religion and speech. The last one of their rulers was Khan Maksud Shah. This ruler died during the year 1930. The Chinese Sinkiang Government took this opportunity to end the Moslem system and the succession of the Khan was not allowed to continue. Maksud's son, Nazir, heir to the throne was summoned to report at Urumchi, then capital of the Sinkiang Provincial Government, and Yolbars, the Tiger Prince, was ordered to appear with him. This was bad news for the Moslem inhabitants. Later, a word came from the capital that the young prince had been made a prisoner in his own lodging, and that there were to be many changes in the standing of the Turki people. When Yolbars returned to Hami he left Nazir in Urumchi, and arrived in company with a band of Chinese officials who at once sat down to business and drew up a list of changes which were to be introduced in the administration of the Moslem community. The old administration

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161 About two-thirds of the total area of Sinkiang is uninhabited.
311 In 1946 the number of farm households was 344,000 and the average number of acres per farm was around 7.1. (Cressey, Land of the
[114] 500 Million, p. 105. This figure, according to other sources, is rather high.. These sources give a figure of from 0.5 to three acres per farm.) The total amount of cultivated land was 2,455,000 acres or roughly one per cent of the total acreage of the region. The greatest concentration of population is south of the Tienshan, or more precisely, in the southwestern corner of the province near the Soviet border. These are the districts of Khotan, Aksu, and Yarkand which contain over two-thirds of the population of the whole province. North of the Tienshan, the greatest concentration is in the Ili valley.

243 According to the figures supplied by Owen Lattimore, the
433 annual wheat crop of Sinkiang before the Communist conquest was about 253,000 tons, about forty-four per cent of the total crop of grain, beans, and seeds. Corn reached 331,000 tons or twenty-eight per cent. Rice was about 71,000 tons or six per cent, and sesame, rapeseed, and linseed accounted for 71,000 tons or six
[244] per cent. Barley, kaoliang, sorghum millet, beets, and peas amounted to 119,000 tons or ten per cent. Millet, soybean, and green beans totalled 71,000 tons or six per cent. Total agricultural output was 916,000 tons. (Pivot of Asia, p. 167.)

243 Winter wheat is grown north of the Tienshan where, in spite of the cold, the seeds are protected by the cover of snow; only spring wheat can be grown south of the Tienshan, where lack of snow cover exposes the seed to being frozen in the ground. Wheat is tending to be displaced by rice in oasis fields because the fields are highly alkaline. But the yield of rice is lower than that of corn, because the Uighur farmers do not transplant the young rice
[461] shoots as Chinese farmers do. Although the amount of labor
[433] expended on a unit of land is about the same in Sinkiang as in China Proper, the yield is somewhat less.

248 Cotton is the most important commercial crop in Sinkiang. It was grown in Turfan as early as the T'ang Dynasty (618 - 907). Two varieties are raised: the native and the American. In 1943, 100,000 acres of cotton were planted, seventy-three per cent with native cotton and twenty-three per cent with seed
288 of the American varieties. Silk is also an ancient crop of com-
433 mercial importance. Its production reached 350,000 kg. in 1942 but fell drastically to 100,000 kg. in 1943.

592 The family group, living together under one roof, is the basic
241 producing unit in oasis agriculture. It often includes married children, which makes it slightly larger than the average farm family in China. While farms in the Tarim Basin average from
[423] 4.5 to six acres in size, larger than the 3.5 acres given for China Proper, because the family in Sinkiang is larger, there is only